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California Institute of Technology* 
Until the recent spate of legal and IRS trouble, professional 
team sports has been one of the most robust growth industries in the 
U. S. In 1959, there were 42 franchises in the five major sports 
leagues; by 1974, there were 117 franchises in eight major sports 
leagues. Evidence of the boom can be found in the growth in attendance 
and in an increase in ticket prices; in the rise in television coverage 
and in the dollars spent for TV rights; and in the increase in player 
salaries. That boom is also reflected in the prices of sports franchises 
the subject of this paper. 
Two examples of the phenomenal increase in prices of sports 
franchises might be noted. In 1933, the Philadelphia Eagles (NFL) sold 
for $2500. That price had increased 100-fold to $250, 000 by 1949. 
Fourteen years later, there had been an additional 20-fold increase to 
$ 5. 5 m.illion. In 1967, the Eagles sold for $14. 5 million, and in 1969 
the team brought-$16. 2 million. The story of another NFL team, the 
Los Angels (formerly Clevela,nd) Rams, is similar. The Rams sold 
for $10, 000 in 1937; for $141, 000 in 1941; for $7 million in 1962; and 
for $19 million in 1972. 1 
�' We would like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Sue Groth, 
Kim Border, Derek McKay, and Jennie Owen , all of whom put in long 
hours in the colledion and tabulation of the information presented here. 
1. In constant (19�4 dollars) the figures for the Eagles are $8,620 for 
1933, 470, 000 for 1949, 8. 0 3 milliqn in 1963, 19. 4 million in 1967 and 19. 8 iu 1969. For the Rams the figures are $ 31,100 in 1937, $429,000 in 1941, 
$10. 4 million in 1962 and ZO. 3 million in 1972. 
As the industry has grown, so has academic interest. In the 
past five years the economics of sports has become a favorite subject 
2 
for the academic journals, Ph. D. dissertations have been written, books 
published and even that august body, the Brookings Institute, has sponsored 
a conference on the subject. Despite this display of interest, the empirical 
foun�ation of the analysis has been notoriously weak. Government statisti­
cians do not gather the relevant data, the tean"lS seldom make their financial 
records public, and historians of sports have more interest i� the won-
loss records than in the profitability of team business operations. This 
paper attempts to correct the data deficiencies on franchise sales, In 
addition it examines the factors that have influenced franchise values 
and turnovers. We turn first to a summary of historical data 011 franchise 
sales. 
'fhe Data 
The appendix to this paper gives the history of franchise turnovers 
for all major league sports franchises in existence as of April 1974. Due 
to data problems no attempt has been made to study the financial histories 
of abandoned franchises, a common phenomenon in the early years of every 
sports league. Data for basketball, baseball and football are summarized 
in Tables I, II and Ill of this section. 
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The basic s·ources of data for our 
study we.re the New·York Times and Sporting News, supplemented by 
iJ?.terviews with team and league officials, For each of the existing major 
league franchises, consistency checks were made to insure that no major 
transfers of ownership interest were overlooked. Thus the data on timing 
of franchise turnovers are quite reliable. · On the other bp.nd, sales prices 
of franchises are subject to several sources of error. First, in most cases, 
the data represent estimates by reporters based on their contacts with· 
teams and leagues. Since most teams are closely held corporations, 
2, Information on hockey is so scattered that summary data has not been 
tabulated. 
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there is no legal obligation to report prices at which franchises are 
sold, Second, the terms under which sales take place, including the 
timing of payments, are rarely reported. Consequently a quoted figure 
for the value of a franchise might overstate the cash equivalent purchase 
price for the franchise, if payments are delayed into the futu1·e. Third, 
certain of the sales that have taken place might well be "sweetheart" 
arrangements, expecially in cases where the buyer is an important 
member of the selling group. This could be particularly relevant for 
"consolidations" in which transfers of ownership occur within an existing 
group of stockholders, For these and related reasons, value data when 
reported tend to be less reliable than data on nwnber and timing of turn­
overs. Beyond th.;...;, for a number of transactions, no value data were 
available, so there remain important deficiencies in the series on 
franchise values presented here and in the appendix. Still the series is 
more complete and probably much more reliable than the previously 
available data. 
We have provided separate tabulations of sales of existing 
franchises, consolidations and sales by leagues of expansion franchises. 
Expansion franchises on the average sell for less than existing franchises 
. both because of the less· favorable geographic locations of these franchises 
and because of the poorer quality of players available ti> such franchises 
in the expansion draft. 3 The data as shown in the accompanying summary 
tables are not completely consistent with these inferences, but the incon­
sistency may be the result of a statistical illusion. It appears that when 
existing teams are sold, the quoted sales price is close to the cash 
equivalent value of the franchise; that is, the franchise is either sold 
for cash or with payment terms at the market rate of interest. 
In contrast, expansion franchise sales involve relatively small down 
3 .  If you assume the best locations are taken first, then the loca­
tion argument follows directly. Similarly, while some existing franchises 
may have only poor players the drafting procedure guarantees that the 
expansion franchise will have nothing but poor players. 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
( 6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
( 1 1) 
(12) 
(13) 
Table I - BA SKE T BA LL (NBA) 
1950- 1955- 1960- 1965-
1954 1959 1964 1969 
No. Team Years 35 39 44 64 
Sales 1 3 5 3 
Consolid. & Reorg. 0 0 0 1 
Inheritance 0 0 1 0 
Expansions 0 0 1 ·5
Total Turnovers 1 3 7 9 
(2) I (1) .026 .077 • 1 14 .047 
( 5) I ( 1) .023 .078 
( 6) I ( 1) .026 .077 . 15 9 • 14 1 
(2) (2) (3) 
Avg. Sales Price - - - $187' 500. $975 K $3. 8671vJ 
Avg. Consolid. Price. 
-·- .. - - -
(5) 
Avg. Expansion Price 
Sl. 820 M --- - - -
(2) (2) ( 8) 
Avg. Price/Turnover 
�187,500 $975 K p2. 588 M -- -
Source: Appendix Table 1 
1970-
1974 
86 
7 
2 
0 
4 
13 
• 08 1 
.047 
• 15 1 
(3) 
$4. 9001v'. 
(4) 
$4. 313 M 
(7) 
$4. 5?4M 
Figures in parenthesis in the table are the number of observations. 
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Table II - BA S E BA L L 5 
1920- 192 5.: 1930- 1935- 1940- 1945- · 19so- 1955- 1960- 1965- 1970-
1924 1929 1934 1939 1944 1949 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 
( 1) No. Team Years 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 100 108 120 
(2) Sales 6 3 2 2 4 7 7 3 6 4 5 
( 3) C on solid. & Reorg. 2 3 2 3 2 1 2 0 0 2 0 
(4) Inheritance 2 1 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
· -- . .
(5) Expansions 0 0 0 0 0 0 o· 0 4 4 0 
(6) Total Turnovers 10 7. 7 8 6 8 9 3 10 10 5 
(7) (2) I (1) .07 5  .038 .025 .025 . 050 .088 .088 .038 . 060 .037 .042 
( 8) ( 5) I ( 1) -- - --- --- • 040 .037 
( 9) ( 6) I ( 1) . 125 . 088 .088 • 100 . •  075 • 100 • 1 13 .038 • 100 . 093 • 042 
(2) (3) (2) (1) ( 3) (7) { 6) (3) (4) (3) (5) 
(10) Avg. Sales Price $750 K $1.558 M $1.020 M $325 K $570 K $2.130 M $2.957 M $4.820 M $6. 984 Jvj $8.617 M $10.358lV 
(2) (3) ( 1) (1) (2) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) 
( 1 1) Avg. C on s o 1i d. Price $2.250 M $1.058 M $1.340 M $2.00 M $419 K $1. 786 M $4.625 M $14. 0 M ... -- --- - - -
(4) (4) 
(12) Avg. Expansion Price $2.201 M $7.788M - - - -- - - -- ---
(4) ( 6) (3) (2) ( 5) (8) ( 6) ( 3) (10) (8) (5) 
(13) Avg. Frie e I Turnover $1. 500 M $1.308 M $1.127 M $1.163 M $509 K $2.087 M $2. 95 7 :rv $4.820Jv $5.0llM $8.806 M $10.358
Source: Appendix Table 2 
Figures in parenthesis in the table are the number of observations. 
Table III - F 0 0 T B  ALL 6 
1920- 1930- 1940- 1945- 1950- 1955- 1960- 1965- 1970-
1929 1939 1944 1949 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 
( 1) No. Team Years 32 7 1  44 54 58 68 110 127 118 
(2) Sales 3 3 5 2 2 0 5 3 2 
(3) Consolid. & Reorg. 0 2 1 4 0 1 5 4 2 
(4 ) Inheritance 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
(5 ) Expansions 2 3 1 1 0 8 2 4 1 
( 6) Total Turnovers 5 8 7 5 3 9 13 11 5 
(7) ( 2) I ( 1) .094 . 042 . 114 .037 .034 0 .045 .024 . 0 17 
(8 ) ( s) I ( 1) . 062 .042 . 023 • 0 19 0 . 118 • 0 18 . 0 3 1 .008 
( 9 )  (6 )/ ( 1) • 156 . 112 • 15 9 . . 093 . 052 • 132 . 118 .087 • 042 
( 1) ( 1) (3) ( 1) ( 1) ( 5 )  (3 ) (2) 
(10 ) Avg. Sales Price $25q $15, 000 $168 K $250 K $600.K :;3.632 M $13.555 M $19.0 M - - -
( 1) ( 1) (3 ) (2) (2) 
(11) Avg. Consolid. Price $15, 000 $2. 3M , )3.875 M $4.940 M $11.115 1V'. - - - --- --- ---
( 1) (2 ) (2) (4 ) ( 1) 
(12)  Avg. Expansion Price $ 500 $ 6, 250 --- --- --- --- $600 K $7.938M $16.0 M 
(4 ) (3) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) (10 ) (9 ) ( 5 )  
(13)  Avg. Frie e I Turnover $325 $10, .625 $168 K $250 K $600 K $2. 3M $3. lM $9.144 M $15.2461\t'. 
--
Source: Appendix Table 3 
Figures in parenthesis in the table are the number of observations. 
100 M 
FIGURE I, I 
FRANCHISE SALES PRICES* 
(Five Year Average) 
10 M 
lM 
100 K 
lOK 
1922 1932 1942 1952 1962 1972 
* Excluding league sales of e�pansion franchises 
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payments (20 to 40 percent of total), coupled with interest free payments 
over a period of from three to five years. The prices shown in the tables 
for expansion franchises are the undiscounted amounts paid by the 
purchaser, hence such pric�s overstate the value of expansion franchises 
relative to existing franchises, Due to lack of information concerning 
precise payment terms, it has not been .Possible to adjust expansion
prices to provide direct comparability with prices of existing teams, 
Franchise Values and Turnovers 
The results of our empirical investigation into franchise turnovers 
are summarized by sport in Tables I, II, and III and in Figure I. Clearly 
the value of franchises has been increasing for all sports since the second 
world war,4 In the case of basketball, there are few price observations 
before the 1960s, but the average value of a franchise rose four times in 
the ensuring half decade and another four times in the next five years. 
Increases have continued but at a slower rate during the 1970s, 
The rate of increase for football is quite comparable, but the 
observed period of that increase is much longer. In 1920 when the NFL 
was organized franchises had almost no value (the Green Bay franchise 
wa:s sold for $250), but despite the depression the average value had reached 
4. The reader should bear in mind that the rate of increase in franchise 
value is probably overstated. In the years before 1959 (when the tax status 
of franchises changed), there was almost certainly a tendency for unprofit­
able (and therefore lower priced) franchises to turn over more often than 
profitable ones. Thus the lower valued franchises are overrrepresented · 
in our sample and the average value figures are almost certainly too low. 
For example, of the five baseball franchises sold between 1950 and 1954 
for which value data were available, four showed losses over the period 
1952-6 (St. Louis, AL (twice); St, Louis, NL; Phil. , AL; Pitt. , NL); of 
the teams sold only Brooklyn showed a profit over the period. After 1959 
however, the proportion of "low priced" franchises in the sample may well 
have declined as there was an increase in the incentives to sell profitable 
franchises. 
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$10, 000 within two decades. World War II slowed the rate of growth slightly. 
At.War's end, however, a franchise was bringing about a quarter of a 
million dollars, and by .the mid fifties that figure had reached $2 million. 
Data from 1960 cover both AFL and NFL teams, hence the rate of increase 
in franchise values for NFL teams is no doubt understated particularly 
in the 
.
1960-64 period. But, by the mid sixties, the diffusion of the tax 
sheltering aspects of ownership and the rumor of inter league merger 
were sufficient to once a.gain increase the rate of growth, and in 196 6  
the fi�st $10 million transaction occurred. Since 1970 prices have 
continued to rise, and although there is recent evidence of market 
softening, the Baltimore Colts were sold for a record $19 million dollars 
in 1972. 
The pattern for baseball is quite different from that for the other 
two sports. Older and more mature , it was never a "growth industry" 
during the period under consideration. Like almost all established 
industries, profits and thus franchise values were hit hard by the depression, 
and as with other nonessential industries they did not recover during the War. 
Since VJ Day, price� have approximately doubled every decade. That 
rate of growth is much below the increases experienced by football and 
basketball, but like those other sports there is evidence of retardation. 
Comparisons o! growth rates of franchise values are shown in 
Table IV .. 
Table IV. Average Annual Rates of Growth in 
Franchise Values, Selected Periods 
1952- 1962- i 952- 1957- i 962-Sales of· Existing Teams 
1972 1972 1957 1962 1967 
Basketball (N BA) n. a. 14. 9% n. a. 39. 1% 31. 7% 
Baseball 6. 5% 4. 0% IO. 3o/o 7. 2% 4. 3% 
Football 18. 9% 18. 2% 19. 8% 30. 2% 
1967-
1972 
4. 8%.
3. 8% 
7. 0% 
(Data are for sales of existing teams; consolidations and expansions are 
excluded). �ootball figure of 19. 8% represents the annual growth rate 
1952-62. 
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Turnover rates (expressed relative to number of team years) 
are shown in items (7), (8) and (9) of Tables I, II, III. These rates pro­
vide a crude indication of the permanency and stability of ownership of 
sports teams. Turnovers were from 1 1 /2 to 2 times as frequent in 
basketball as in either football or baseball, and while the basketball 
rate shows a marked increase after 1959, the football and baseball rates 
do not. 
Certain other dimensions of the turnover variable are captured 
in the tables below. 
Table V. Percent of Team Sales (Including Consolidations) 
Taking Place Within 5 Years and Within 10 Years 
Years 
1940-49 
1950-59 
l960-69  
1970-74 
1950 
196 0  
1970 
1974 
of Purchase of a Team 
Baseball Basketball (NBA) Football 
No owned owned No owned owned No owned owned 
of 5 yrs 10 yrs of 5 yrs 10 yrs of 5 yrs 10 yrs 
sales or or sales or or sales or or less less less less less less 
'10 40% 40% -- - - - - 8 6 3% 100% 
12 6 6% ·75% -- - - - - 2 50% 100% 
9 56% 78% 6 6 6% 83% 16· 44% 75% 
5 20% 100% 7 71% 86% 4 50% 100% 
Table VI. Percentage of Franchises J 0 Years Old 
or Older, Owned for 10 Years or More 
Baseball 
46% 
46% 
70% 
70% 
Basketball (NBA) 
38% 
50% 
Football 
56% 
82% 
50% 
61% 
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Table V indicates that the overwhelming majority of franchise 
sales occur in the case of teams owned for 10 years or less. This 
pattern is common to all three sports. The only noticable gifference 
among the sports is the higher frequency of franchis.e sales within five 
years of puchase in basketball, as compared to football and baseball. 
Data were omitted for basketball in early periods because of the short 
histories of NBA teams. 
Table VI gives an alternative measure of permanence of owner­
ship. Because of the smail numbers of teams involved, no sweeping 
conclusions should be drawn. But there is at least no indication that 
a marked trend away from permanency of ownership is occuring in any 
of the sports. As would be �xpected from the other turnover data, 
permanency of ownership is less com1non in basketball than in the other 
sports. 
It should be emphasized that there are multiple factors at work 
producing the turnover data. Sports teams in general are certainly 
more profitable today than they were fifteen or twenty years ago. This 
should reduce the frequency of franchise sales d•1e to bankruptcy and 
liquidity problems. On the other hand, the changed tax status of team 
ownership after 1959 creates incentives for more' frequent franchise . 
turnovers. The tables show �he combined effects of these two important 
forces."
5 
5. Exclude� from the summary tables are the NHL an·d WHA in hockey 
and the ABA in basketball, due to data limitations. The ABA was formed 
i� 1967. Of �
the original 11 teams, only Indiana had not been sold (or. 
disbanded) a� least once by the spring of 1974. The total turnover rate 
of the ABA (1967-74) was . 18, roughly ZOo/o higher than that of the NBA. 
In the WHA, formed in 1971, there had been 11 turnovers in the lZ 
team league by the spring of 1974, a total turnover rate of . 30. The 
NHL had relatively low turnover rates until the 1966 expansion,. The 
total turnqver rate for the NHL (1970-74) was .13. 
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Profitability and the Valuation of Sports Franchises 
Even given the retardation of the past five years, the most 
striking feature of the data on franchise sales is the rapid rate of growth 
in franchise values in all sports over the past twenty five years. This 
has been the subject of considerable sports page coverage, with three 
major factors being commonly identified as the underlying causes of the 
boom in franchise prices. These are first, the growth in attendance, 
TV revenues and profits in sports, particularly since the mid-1950s; 
second, the tax sheltering aspects of team ownership which became 
widely utilized during the early 1960s; and third, the non-pecuniary 
payoffs to team owners in terms of publicity and prestige which 
accompanied the growth in public interest in professional team sports. 
We wish to examine the relative importance of each of these factors in 
explaining the boom in franchise prices. 
Our basic approach to team valuation is the usual discounted 
present value (DPV) model. In contrast to other markets in professional 
sports (labor, TV, etc.), the market for existing sports franchises 
more closely approximates the competitive norm, hence it seems reason-
able to assume that franchises should sell for prices equal to the DPV1s 
of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary payoffs accruing to purchasers of 
franchises. The appropriate discount rate is one that accurately reflects 
the riskiness of s_ports as an investment, and the prospective purchaser 
should expect to earn a rate of return on his sports investment just 
equal to that· being paid on the best alternative investment of comparable 
riskiness. 
Let Pt denote t.he value of a sports team at the beginning of
year t, let Rt denote the net payoffs in �oney terms from the team at 
the end of year t, and let d denote the discount rate. Ignoring the 
complications introduced by tax considerations, we have 
P = E t r=t 
R 
'I" 
(1 + d) r-t+I 
In particular, assume that the payoffs from ownership of a 
sports team increase at the rate of o percent per' year so that R 
. 'I" 'I" 
= R0(1 + o) • Assuming that 6< d, 
RO 
where P0 =�is the value of P at t = o. 
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Thus, so long as the discount rate d is constant, the observed 
rate of increase in franchise values should be equal to (>, the rate of 
increase in payoffs. 
As noted earlier, we do not have access to comprehensive 
profit data for professional sports teams, hence it is only possible to 
make some crude estimates of the relationship between profitability 
and franchise values. In the late 1950s Congress collected data on 
before tax profits for the period 1952-56 for all m�jor league sports 
teams. Similarly ABA and NBA pr.ofits for 1971 were reported to the 
Ervin C_'ommittee, and aggregated 1973 profits for NFL teams were 
made public by thfl NFL owners in the course of the recent players' 
strike. No comparable recent data exist for baseball, but profits for 
an "average" baseball team for 1969 hav:e been estimated by R, Noll in 
the Bxookings study, Goverrunent and the Sports Business. A comparison 
of the rates of growth of net income before taxes and franchise values 
appears in Table VII. 
Table VII. Growth Rates of Net Income Before Taxes 
and Franchise Values, Professional Sports 
Net Income per Team Avg. Annual 
Before Taxes Growth Rates 
14 
Avg., 
Recent years 
Net Franchise 
1952-6 Income Value* 
Basketball (NBA) -$ 2,000 -$ 31,000 (1971) negative + 17. 5% 
Baseball +$137,000 + $273, 000 (1969) + 4. 7% + 6. 5 %  
Football + $ 69, 000 + $945, 000 (1973) + 14. 8% + 18 . 9 % 
. (1952-6 net income data from Organized Team Sport!J House Committee 
on the Judiciary, 1957. For recent years, basketball data from Professional 
Basketball, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 1971; baseball data from 
Government and the Sports Business, R. Noll, editor, Brookings, 
Washington, 1974; football data from the report on NFL net income, 
1973, NFL owners.) 
. * Basketball, 1962 -1972; baseball and football, 1952-1972. 
Admittedly, any conclusions drawn from the scattered data used 
in Table VIl are at best highly tentative. The growth in franchise values 
in NBA basketball bears no relationship to book profitability, but for 
baseball and football the two move in the same direction. In the latter 
two growth in franchise values outstrips the growth in income before 
taxes. That difference appears to indicate that the boom in franchise. 
values is not completely explained by the growth in revenues and profits 
of sports teams. 
The model as specified, however, ignores the tax sheltering 
aspects of team owners.hip, and it is �hese arrangements that may 
account for the anomalies in Table Vll . 
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Tax Sheltering and the Value of Franchise 
The comparisons between growth in net income and growth 
in franchise values are based on income before taxes, out it is, of 
course, income after taxes that is relevant in· decision making, For 
the past fifteen years, sports has offered special advantages in the way 
of avoiding taxes on income. The tax shelter aspect of ownership of 
a sports team works as follows, 6 
When a team is purchased, the price is allocated by the 
purchaser between the franchise itself and the player contracts owned 
by or assigned to the team. Of the intangible assets owned by a sports 
team, only player contr�cts are viewed as depreciable assets by the 
IRS. Okner finds that the actual percentage allocation to player 
contracts averages between 80 and 90 percent of the sales price, with 
extremes as low as 50 and as high as 99 percent. Contracts may be 
written off against taxable income over the "expected useful playing 
lifetime" of players. At the end of the writeoff period, the owner may 
then sell the team and is subject only to a capital gains tax on the dif­
ference between the new purchase price and the depreciated value of 
the team. 7 The new owner is then free to pei;form the same operation. 
To illustrate the importance of this tax shelter, consider the 
following simple model of .team valuation. Let P denote the price of the 
tea�, and let F be the portion of P assigned to the franchise itself, 
while C is the portion of P as signed to player contracts. Then P = 
F + C. 
6.  Details of  the tax advantage from ownership of  a sports franchise 
are elaborated by Okner in Government and the Sports Business • . . 
7. This assumes no recapture of excess depreciation, which is
the typical case. For a discussion of this issue, see Okner, Ibid. 
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Assume for simplicity that net income is constant over time 
and that the team earns R dollars per year before taxes and before 
depreciation of player contracts. Let a denote the marginal tax rate 
applicable to income earned by the owner of the franchise, and take 
the capital gains tax rate to be 25 percent. Let d be the after tax 
discount rate and assume that the contracts are written off over five 
years; assume further that the team is sold at its original purchase 
price at that time. (Sale after five years maximizes the tax benefits 
from ownership.) Then if the sports team sells for its DPV, we have 
the following formula: 
5 p = I R - a ( R- . ZC) + P - . 25C 
t=l (1 + d)
t (1 + d)5 
Having purchased the team for P dollars, player contracts are 
assigned the value C, and are written off against income over the next 
five years. Thus income subject to tax for each of the next five years 
is R - . ZC. Income after taxes is R - a(R- . ZC). At the end of five 
years, the team is sold for P doll ars. All player contracts have been 
full y deprecia te d, hence the book valu e of the teai;n is imply F. Thus 
a capital gains tax must be paid on P - F = C dollars. 
Let C = aP, where a is the percent of P allocated to player 
.contracts, Then the formula above can be written as 
Hence 
P = (1 - a ) R + . ZaoaP - - - -[ J [dl (1 + d)5 - 1 ] + (1 - . 25a)P 
(1 + .d) 5 (l + d) 5 
P = --�R�(l_- _a..._) .... f .... c1_+.--.;.;.d)._ 5_-...-11.___ ___ _ 
(1 + d)5(d - . 2aa] + · .  Zaa - (l - . 25a)d
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Let i denote the before tax rate of return applicable to that 
risk class of investments characterizing sports franchises. Then d 
can be interpreted a.s the corresponding after tax rate of return. 
Hence with a. being the marginal tax rate, d = (1 - a.)i. In particular, 
·fol'. a = 0 (that is, zero contract writeoffs), the formula above gives 
p = (1 - a. )R = !L
(1 - a. )i 
Thus, for a = 0 the value of the team to any investor is simply the 
DPV of before tax earnings of the team, using the "risk adjusted" 
rate of return i as the discount rate. 
The table below displays the effect of changes in a on the 
value of a team, assuming (i) the risk adjusted before tax :rate of 
return i is 20 percent; (ii) the marginal tax rate is 50 percent; (iii) 
before tax earnings of the team are $1 million per year. 
Table VIII. Value of a Team Earning $1 Million/Year 
Percent of Purchase 
Price Allocated to Contracts 
0 o/o 
20 o/o 
40 o/o 
60 o/o 
80 o/o 
100 o/o 
$ 
'{alue 
5, 000, 000 
5, 660, 000 
6, 540, 000 
7, 740, 000 
9, 470, 000 
1 2, 200, 000 
It should be noted that for most sports teams, taxable income 
after depreciation of player contracts is negative. Thus the full 
advantages of team ow
.
nership are only available to individuals with 
sufficiently large outside incomes to apply all of the after tax losses 
of the team to a reduction of their tax liabilities on such outside 
income. The formulas and the table implicitly assume that full 
advantage is taken of such tax sheltering. 
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Table VIII indicates the importance of contract depreciation 
as an element influencing the value of a sports team. When 80 percent 
of the purchase price is allocated to contracts, eve� at a SOo/o tax rate the 
value of the team is almost twice what it would be if no writeoffs are 
taken. Owners began to take advantage of the depreciation writeoffs 
only after Bill Veeck discov�red the tax loophole in 1959. There should 
therefore have been a market acceleration in the rate of increase in 
franchise values sometime about 1960. Such an increase would occur, 
even if net income before taxes per year were constant. Thus some of 
the anomalies in Table VII appear to be explained by the preferential 
tax treatment. 
With income before taxes increasing each year, the situation 
is somewhat more complex. Assuming that a team is sold every five
years at its DPV, and assuming a constant rate of growth in income 
before taxes of 6 percent per year, the formula for p becomes . t 
t+4 .r 
p
t
= 
I: Ro(l + 6 ) (1 - a.) + .2a. a Pt 
+ 
p
t+5 
r =t (1 + d) T -ttl 
• 2s{pt+5 - (I - a)Pt } 
(1 + d)5 
where 
After some manipulation, this can be written as 
[(l + d)5 - l] 
( I + d)5 
+ . 25(1 - a) 
(1 + d)5 
Hence 
leading to 
where 
' )'� t 
Po
= Po (1 + o) 
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* 
R0(1 - a) { (1 + d)5 _ Cl +  o)5 }PO= d - o d(l + d)5 - .2a a((l + d)5- l] - .25d(l - a) - . 75(1 + o)5 
The introduction of the tax shelter in 1959 should have had two 
partially offsetting effects. First, it should shift upwards the value of teams 
during the period when the market is adjusting to the revision of DPV, 
Because it takes some time for information on the tax shelter to be 
diffused, that shift would probably not be instantaneous but gradual 
(perhaps over a three to five year period). Moreover, although the 
tax rent would be captured by the person or group who owned the team 
at the time of Vee ck' s discovery of the shelter, it would not be picked up 
in the data until the team was actually sold. Second, since a substantial 
part of the "post shelter" value. depends upon an IRS ruling, there must · 
ha:ve been more uncertainty about future net revenues once the teams had 
taken advantage of the shelter. An increase in the riskiness of the 
asset will increase d and, therefore, tend to offset the increase in p*. . . 0 
The situation would probably. not be stable. As •information 
about the tax shelter is diffused and used by more and more teams, the 
probability that the ruling would come under closer IRS scrutiny would· 
likely increase. Since it was based on an administrative interpretation 
of the law both its existence and the extent of its applicability might be 
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increasingly open to question. As a result the appropriate risk discount 
rate d would increase over time as the level of (after tax) income becomes 
less certain, In addition during the sixties that tendency was almost 
certainly reenforced by events not directly related to tax treatment. 
Profitability induced or threatened the entry of new sports leagues (the 
ABA in basketball, the WFL in football, the WHA in hockey and even the 
stillborn Continental League in baseball). Actual or threatened competition 
would also increase the uncertainty of the returns from investment in 
existing leagues, Moreoever, the period was marked by an increasing 
militancy on the part of the players. A militancy that was reflected in 
more effective unionism, strikes, lawsuits challenging the monopolistic 
practices of the leag•_,es and in the case of baseball at least some 
substantial concessions from the owners, The potential costs associated 
with player discontent would also tend to increase d over time. As a 
result we would expect that if the tax status of team sports is changed at 
t*, the time path of Pt 
would, after some learni;g 
( i
e
�
i
:
�· be shifted 
upwards by somewhat less than the ratio p* / O Thereafter 
0 (d - �) 
it would continue to grow at a rate less than 6 percent per year. Figure 
illustrates this path. 
p
t I 
I 
I 
\� I I I I . /! � .I 
t* 
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The data are roughly consistent with the reformulated model. 
The rate of growth of franchise values accelerated around 1960 and th�n 
dropped sharply between 1967 and 1974. It is of interest, that the rate 
of turnovers of baseball and football franchises d?es not ap�ear to have 
been affected by the discovery of the tax shelter. Theory leads to the 
prediction that franchises would be sold more frequently after the innova­
tion. Tax shelter profits can be captured if the franchise is sold each 
time the ·period of contract write offs has elapsed. For those two sports, 
however, there are no significant differences in turnover rates between 
the pre and post 1959 periods, In basket.ball the expected increase in 
turnovers did occur. For the former two sports, profits were a combina­
tion of book and tax shelter,· but for the latter, with few exceptions, book 
profits were zero or, more likely, negative. Since the only source of after 
tax profits for the typical basketball team is the tax shelter, there was 
clearly more incentive to turn over basketball than football or baseball 
franchises, Still one would.expect some increase in the frequency of 
turnover for the "book profitable" sports. While the near fifteen percent 
per year gains in capHal value for football may make that sport a good 
investme
.
nt even without the tax shelter, it is certainly not clear why 
there has not been a greater turnover of baseball Clubs. 
. It has been argued that ownership of a professional sports 
�ranchise brings with it some .non pecuniary as well as monetary profits. 
Some indication of the change in the role played by the consumption aspects 
of ownership can be seen in the following rough calculations, Assuming 
that t�e innovation of the tax shelter doubled franchise v�lues between 
1959 and 1965, we can correct the observed increase in franchise valua­
tion for that change. From that reduced figure we can further deduct 
the rate of growth of net income before taxes, and the .residual should· 
include in it the increase in the consmnption component of any of franchise 
ownership. The results are displayed in Table IX. Since all external 
evidence suggests tha.t team sports were becoming more popular over the 
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period, the consumption component, if it exists, would be expected to 
increase, and such an increase should produce a positive residual. 
(Although a positive residual is no guarantee of such psychic income.) 
For football there is no "unexplained residual" -- the entire growth is 
accounted for by growth in income before taxes and the tax shelter. For 
baseball the residual is negative - - p_erhaps an indication that the psychic 
increments have declined. Only in the case of basketball is the residual 
positive; however, the existence of negative before tax incomes for 
most teams in the NBA makes the residual very difficult to interpret. 
While it might reflect some increase in prestige value it might instead 
only represent an understatement of the impact on franchise values of 
the introduction of the tax shelter. 8 
Table IX. Annual Growth Rates 1952-1972 
( 1) (2) (3) (4) 
Observed Tax Net Income Residual 
Franchise Shelter(J) . Before (l)-(Z)-(3) 
Value Adjustment Taxes 
Basketball@ +24. 3% 
(NBA) 
5. 7% negative +18. 6% 
Baseball + 6, 5% 3, 7% 4. 7% - I. 9% 
Football +18. 9o/o 4. lo/o 14. 8% 0 
CD Tax shelter calculations based on 50% marginal tax rate and 
80% assignment
. of asset values to player contracts. These assumptions 
produce a doubling of asset values for a team earning a constant $1 million 
8 .  To clarify, note that if a team is expected to earn zero profits 
per year ad infinitum, its DPV is zero in the absence of the tax shelter. 
Once the tax shelter is introduced, there are positive after tax profits 
during the period of contract write offs, and hence a positive DPV. With 
the average basketball team showing zero or negative before tax income, 
the introduction of the tax shelter increases the DPV of such teams by 
infinite percent. Clearly the assumption of a doubling of franchise prices 
due to the tax shelter understates' things for basketball. 
23 
profit. Column (2) is calculated in the following manner. Let a equal the 
growth rate after adjustment and let r equal the rate before adjustm�nt. 
Let V 0 be the value of a team in 1952 and let 
V 20 be the value of the team 
. in 1972. Then r and' a are solved for from: 
It follows that 
20 v 20 = 2v 0(1 + a) 
12&1log(l + a) = log(l  + r) - 20 
Then r - a = tax shelter adj�stment 
@ Basketball franchise value comparisons are between 1957 
and 197Z. 
While there is no way to predict future cha.nges in the non 
monetary component of franchise valuations, the model developed in this 
paper, when coupled with recent exogenous developments suggests that 
the rapid growth of franchise valuation may be a thing of the past. The 
recent federal court decision in the Atlanta Falcons case -- a decision 
that reduced the percent of the value of the team •that could be assigned 
to player contracts from 99 to 40 -- could have an important short-run 
. effect on franchise values, If applied across the board to all professional 
sports teams, the decision could cut the value of franchises by up to one­
third. Moreover, by increasing the uncertainty, i.e. future decisions 
might further eliminate the tax shelter,· it would in the .long r�n reduce 
franchise value,. even if before tax profits continue to increase. 
From the owners point of view the past two decades may well be 
termed the Golden Age of professional sports. Recently attacks on the 
structure from without (both the player depreciation allowances and the 
leagues labor practices'have been challenged in the courts) and from 
within CbY. ever more militant players associations) make it likely that 
the Golden Age is passing. It seems reasonable to conclude this paper 
by attempting to estimate the profitability of investment in professional 
team sports during the hey days of the 1950s and 1960s, We recognize 
that these estimates will be very crude. The absence of year by year 
data makes it possible only to compare a few years in the mid 1950s 
with a single year at the end of the period, but given the data, that 
comparison is the only one that it is possible to make, External 
evidence suggests, however, that the simplication may not distort 
history too much, and that the industry was characterized by a reasonably 
steady rate of growth over the period. Table X displays the annual rates 
of growth of attendance per team in baseball, the National Football 
League and the N.:.tional Basketball Association was as well as the growth 
rates of radio and television income for the former two. While there 
are substantial year to year fluctuations the attendance shows a fairly 
steady pattern of growth. Electronic income is similar except in the 
early 1960s when the innovation of national contracts had a major short­
term impact. 
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Table X. Annual Growth Rate of Attendance and Radiu-TV Income per Team 
Years 55-56 56-57 57-58 58-59 59-60 60-61 61-62 6Z-63 63-64 64-65 65-66 66-67 67-68 68-69 69-70 70-71 71-7Z 7Z-73 
Atten, - .4 Z.8 Z,6 9. 6 4.0 - 5. 1 - 9. 4 - 4.Z 3, 9 9.Z 12. 3 - 17. 4 - 3. 0 - l. 8 5.6 l. 5 - • 7 3. 9 
Baseball 
Radio.-Tv 16. 8 16. 0 31. 4 - 4.8 - l� 0 3. 0 5. 3 36.8 5. 0 - • B 6.7 5. l Z.4 1. 9 
Atten. 0 1 o. 9 6,Z 4.2 - 7, 9 l 7. l 1. l 3. 5 1 o. 3 • 9 7.8 6. 9 • 8 l. 9 6.Z 6. 5 3.5 3.0 
NFL 
Radio-TV 1 8.4 zo. 7 17. 1 15. 2. 8. z 5. 5 ·48. z 3.0 1 77. o. . 3, 5 21 . 9 • 5 .4 - • 9 31 .1 . l 
NBA Atten. 10. 3 10. 6 3. 6 -· 6. 6· 14.6 • 8 10. 0 12.8 - 9,6 - 2 .  6 3. 9 1 6. 3 - l. l 7. 1 3. 0 
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Table XI provides some estimates, Panel A shows the annual 
rate of return for an investor who bought an average club in the early 
1950s and sold it two decades later; Panel B the same figures for the 
investor who recognized the benefits of the Veeck ruling before the 
industry in general and made a short term investment to take advantage 
* 
of it. For the sportsman, the investment in a basketball or football 
franchise would have brought about a 20 percent return, but acquisition 
of a baseball team returned a much lower amount. As we have seen, 
baseball was not a growth industry like the other two sports. 
While aside from an investment in the national pastime, the 
sportsman investor was hardly penalized for his choice of investment 
alternatives, the largest prqfits were reserved for the businessmen who 
moved into the industry in the wake of the discovery of the Veeck tax 
shelter. For those short-term investors, basketball returned about 
30 percent a year and football about 50. Even investment in the lagging 
baseball industry produced returns of over 10 percent. Moreover, for 
that sport returns to the owner from the tax shelter were concentrated 
in current income rather than capital appreciation so that after tax 
earnings of o\lmers in the 70 percent bracket were higher than those in 
the 50, 
The growth of spectator interest, favorable tax treatment, an:d 
the motiopolistic practices of the sports leagues combined to make 
investment in team sports a very profitable activity in the two decades 
following the Korean War. Twenty years earlier the sportsman 
investor may frequently have subsidized the American spectatqr, By 
the 19.SOs he was well paid for his contribution, but the businessman 
investor interested in the short-term exploitation of the Veeck tax 
9. The period 1960 to 1965 would have been better, but the data are
not available. The panel B estimates are almost certainly below the 
rates that would have been earned in that earlier period. 
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shelter was even better rewarded. Given the size of the profits, it is 
hardly surprising that the IRS is taking a careful look at depreciation 
practices, that the Justice Department is becoming concerned with the 
monopolistic aspects of the industry, and that the players are beginning 
to demand a larger share of the pie. 
Table XI. Annual Rates of Return After Taxes Earned on 
Investment in Sports Franchises* 
A. Purchase in 1952. (NBA 1957) for Sale in 1972. 
Marginal Tax Rate 
50% 70% 
Basketball 21. 9% 20. 7% 
Baseball 7.4% s. 7"/o 
Football 22.8% 19. 9% 
B. Purchase in 1962 for Sale in 1967 
� 70% 
Basketball 30.2% 2.9. 5% 
Baseball 10.4% 11. 7% 
Football 51. 0% 47.6% 
The formulas used in deriving the above after tax rates of 
return on investment in sports teams are the following. 
* Capital gains tax rate taken to be �0% of the marginal tax r�te. 
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Purchase in 1952 (NBA 1957) for sale in 1972. 
Purchase in 1962 for sale in 196 7. 
5 t+lO t+lO R l 952(1 + 6) - n(R1952(1 + 6) - • 16P1962 p = L: ---'------'-- ----�=-1962 
(1 )t t=l + r 
where P denotes average price of a team, R is average income before 
taxes per team, 6 is the annual rate of growth of income (1952-1972), 
Cl is the marginal tax rate, � is the capital gains tax rate, and r is the 
rate of return on investment in an average team. The second formula 
incorporates the assumption that 80% of the value of a team is assigned 
to player contracts and the write off period is 5 ye
.
are. 
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APPENDIX 
The accompanying tables summarize transaction and value 
data on a team by team basis for all 
.
sports dating back to 1920. The 
value data shown in the tables are reported dollar figures at which 
sales took place except in cases where the value is enclosed in paren­
theses. Such parenthetical values are either reported offers for teams 
(designated by 0), asked prices (designated by A), or are journalistic 
estimates of the value of the team at the designated point in time; in 
any case they do ,1ot represent actual transaction values, and they are 
not included in the summary tables appearing in the body of the paper. 
The notation used in identifying transactions is the following: 
E = expansion team 
C = consolidation sales largely among existing owners 
Ct ::: consolidation sale with increase in group size 
I = inheritance (% fraction of team inherited follows the symbol 
I, if inheritance is fractional) 
0 ::: offer 
M ::: merger 
A = asked price 
S ::: sale largely new owners 
R = reorganization 
T = sale with franchise move to a new city 
B =bankrupt 
AFL = American Football League 
AAC = All American Football Conference 
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Carolina 
San Antonio 
Denver 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
Memphis 
New Y ork Nets 
San Diego 
Utah 
Virginia Sq,1ires 
Pittsburgh 
Floridians 
American Basketball Association 
1967 - $30, 000 original ABA franchis e (Houston) 
19 69 - sold and moved to Carolina 
197 1  - sold 
196 7  - $30,  000 original A BA franchise (Dallas)  
sold before 1967 season 
1973 - sold and moved to San Antonio 
1967 - $30, 000 original A BA franc his e  
1972 - sold 
19 67 - $30 ,  000 original A BA franchise 
1967 - $ 30,  000 original ABA franchise 
1973 � s old 
1973 - sold for $2, 000, 000 
36 
1967 - $30, 000 original A BA franchise (New Orleans )  
1970 - s old and moved t o  Memphis 
1972 - sold 
1967 - $30 ,  000 original ABA franchise 
1969 - sold for $1 ,  100, 000 
1972 - expansion $1, 000, 000 
1967 - $30, 000 original A BA franchise (Anaheim) 
19 68 - s old and moved to Los Angeles 
1970 - sold and moved to Utah 
1974 - s old 
1967 - $30,  000 original A BA franchise (Oakland) 
1969 - sold for approximately $2, 000, 000 and moved 
to Washington 
1970 - moved to Norfolk, Virginia 
1967 - $30, 000 original A BA franchise 
1972 - disbanded 
1967 - $ 30 ,  000 original A BA franchise 
1972 - disbanded 
San Diego 
Vancouver 
Chicago 
Cleveland 
Toronto 
Detroit 
New England 
Minnesota 
Houston 
A lberta 
Quebec 
. Winnipeg 
Phoenix 
Indianapolis 
Cincinnati 
37 
World Hockey A ssociation 
197 1  - $125, 000 original WHA franchise (New York Raiders) 
1972 - bankrupt, taken over by WHA 
1972 - sold by WHA for $800 ,  000 
1973 - bankrupt, taken over by WHA , moved to New Jersey 
(Jersey Knights) 
· 
1974 - s old for $2, 000, 000, moved to San Diego for 174- '75 
season 
197 1 - $125 , 000 original WHA franchi se (Miami) 
197 1  - sold (for $125, 000), moved to Philadelphia 
1972 - sold for $2, 300, 000 
1973 - moved to Vancouver 
197 1 - $125, 000 original WHA franchise 
197 1  - $125, 000 original WHA franchise 
197 1  - $125, 000 original WHA franchise (Ottawa) 
1973 - moved to Toronto 
197 1  - $125 , 000 original WHA franchise (Los Angeles) 
1972 - bankrupt, sold 
1974 - s o 1 d for $2 , 000, 000 , moved to Detroit for '74- '75
season 
197 1  - $125 , 000 original WHA franchise (Boston) 
1974 - moved to Hartford for ' 74-1 75 season 
197 1 ·- $125 , 000 original WHA franchise 
1974 - sold 
197 1 - $125, 000 original WHA franchise 
1974 - sold 
197 1  - $125, 000 original WHA franchise 
197 1 - assigned to Gary Davidson, original WHA franchise 
(San Francisco) 
197 1  - sold for $275, 000 and moved to Quebec for '71- ' 72 
season 
197 1 - $125 , 000 original WHA franchise  
1974. - up for sale, asking price $3, 000, 000 
1974 - expansion $2, 000, 000 (for 1 74- 175 season) 
1974 - expansion $2, 000, 000 (for 174- 175 s eason) 
1974: - expansion $2, 000, 000 (for 1 75- 176 s eason) 
